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Introduction
Intellectual property protection for computer software in the U.S. is
available in a number of forms. Software can now be protected by both
patents and copyrights in the U.S., with some software copyrights being
given a broad scope of protection against non-literal infringement, such
as by a user interface.' Does the extent of currently available intellectual
property protection for software through patent and copyright represent
a disaster for the software community? A segment of that community
strongly believes that it does.2 Those beliefs, however, are not univer-
sally accepted there.' A review of the arguments advanced for abolishing
patent protection for software and copyright protection for user inter-
faces leads to the conclusion that the case for such abolition remains
unproven. Software patents have an important role to play in providing
protection against misappropriation of inventive concepts that is more
appropriate than an expanded scope for software copyrights.
I
Background
The basis for the U.S. patent and copyright laws is found in the
Constitution as follows: "The Congress shall have Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."4 It should be noted that this provision does not re-
quire the existence of such protection. It merely authorizes Congress to
provide the protection for the specific purpose of promoting progress in
science and useful arts. It therefore cannot validly be maintained that
intellectual property protection for software is constitutionally required.
However, the presence of this provision in the Constitution shows that
there is a strong bias in our fundamental law for intellectual property
protection.
This clause in the Constitution was adopted without debate, and
there is thus little material explaining it. A comment by James Madison
1. See generally, Willis E. Higgins, Technological Poetry: The Interface Between Copy-
rights and Patents for Software, 12 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 67 (1989).
2. See Brian Kahin, The Software Patent Crisis, TECH. REV., Apr. 1991, at 52; THE
LEAGUE FOR PROGRAMMING FREEDOM, AGAINST USER INTERFACE COPYRIGHT (1990);
THE LEAGUE FOR PROGRAMMING FREEDOM, AGAINST SOFTWARE PATENTS (1990). Both
of these articles by the League for Programming Freedom are available on-line through In-
ternet at league prep.ai.mit.edu.
3. PAUL HECKEL, THE ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY SOFTWARE DESIGN 223-94 (2d. ed.
Sybex 1991).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 14:315
FOR SOFrWARE PATENT PROTECTION
in The Federalist No. 43 reveals that the public policy behind both copy-
right and patent protection is the same:
The utility of this power will be scarcely questioned. The copy-
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a
right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in
both cases with the claims of individuals.
5
This public policy was explained in more detail by the Supreme Court as
follows:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors to "Science
and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with services rendered.6
The development of this country from an agrarian society to the world's
preeminent economic power is one indicator of the success of this policy.
This constitutional basis for intellectual property laws has resulted in a
strong commitment by the federal judiciary to protect the work products
of authors and inventors against misappropriation.
Arguments against intellectual property protection for software con-
tinue to remain outside of the intellectual mainstream. At issue is the
degree and nature of such protection. Any doubt that computer software
was covered by the copyright laws was foreclosed by the 1980 amend-
ments to the Copyright Act of 1976," which specifically provides for
software as copyrightable subject matter.8 In contrast, patent protection
for software was generally thought not to be available prior to a 1981
Supreme Court decision holding that patent protection was available for
a rubber curing process implemented with software. 9 It would be inaccu-
rate to claim that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office "unilaterally"
decided in response to the Diehr decision to start issuing large numbers
of software patents. This claim ignores the role of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which hears patent appeals, both from the Patent
and Trademark Office and the U.S. district courts, and its predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The Diehr decision
represented an acceptance by the Supreme Court of positions taken by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and subsequently confirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In any case, there is no
real doubt that both copyright and patent protection are presently avail-
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed., 1941).
6. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953).
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
8. Id. §§ 101-102, 117.
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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able for software. It is in light of this background that one should con-
sider not whether or not software is proper subject matter for patent
protection, but whether or not it should be.
II
A Response to Mr. Stallman
Mr. Stallman has presented a number of arguments against patent
protection for software. Two arguments dominate his analysis. First, he
argues that the Patent and Trademark Office has mistakenly issued pat-
ents for software on various occasions.
Mr. Stallman refers to U.S. patent number 4,736,308 - dealing
with nested scrollable objects - which was the subject of litigation be-
tween Quickpoint Systems and Apple Computer Corporation. The argu-
ment advanced is that both scrolling and subwindows were known in the
art and that it was therefore inappropriate to issue a patent for merely
combining these elements. Most inventions, however, are combinations
of old elements and such combinations are patentable unless they are
suggested by the prior art."l The bottom line in this case was that Apple
apparently felt there was some merit to Quickpoint's position. Apple set-
tled the litigation by taking a license for a substantial payment, the
amount of which is confidential, a common practice for such
agreements. 1
If a patent is believed to have been issued by the Patent and Trade-
mark Office by mistake because the Office lacked the best prior art during
the examination process, the patent can be reduced or eliminated by
someone coming forth with the better prior art.12 Concerns about the
Patent and Trademark Office issuing patents in ignorance of common-
place software techniques are best addressed by efforts to insure that the
Patent and Trademark Office has the best art available. If the position is
simply that of disagreeing with the decision of the Patent and Trademark
Office to issue the patent over the prior art that was considered, it is
hardly a compelling argument for categorizing a patent as absurd. A
truly absurd patent will not be honored by the concerned technical com-
munity. One need only read the "Letters to the Editor" in any weekly
issue of Science magazine to see that disagreements on scientific and tech-
nical issues are commonplace. Better prior art than that considered by
the Patent and Trademark Office can be called to the attention of the
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining patentable subject matter); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103
(1988) (setting the standards of novelty and non-obviousness).
11. HECKEL, supra note 3, at 265.
12. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 25-26 (1988).
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Patent and Trademark Office through requests for re-examination13 or
made available to parties who are accused of infringing a patent.
Reference is also made to U.S. patent number 4,555,775, which is
owned by AT&T and which deals with the use of "backing store" in a
window that lets multiple programs have windows. Mr. Stallman argues
that the patent covers a technique that was obvious to those skilled in the
art and that the issuance of a patent was therefore inappropriate. Again,
this is merely a factual argument. The existence of controversy over pat-
ents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office does not mean that pat-
ents for software should be abolished.
A second argument is that the burden of software patents will ad-
versely affect the industry. Mr. Stallman argues that software costs less
to write, market, and sell than other products of similar complexity, but
will contain just as many possibly patented techniques. Due to the con-
siderable transactional cost of obtaining and enforcing a software patent,
however, it is unlikely that excessive use of patents will occur. Software
patents are among the most expensive patents to obtain since they deal
with subject matter that is esoteric in nature. A typical software patent
will cost $10,000 or more just for preparation and prosecution. In addi-
tion to the monetary cost, the transactional cost includes a substantial
amount of time that the inventors must spend with a patent attorney
helping the attorney prepare and prosecute the application. Inventors
must therefore be selective in their decisions to seek patent prosecution
for potentially patentable techniques in software. Claims that these
transactional costs unfairly burden the small or entrepreneurial enter-
prise ignore the fact that patents may be the only way for such an enter-
prise to adequately protect itself from a larger competitor. Without
patent protection, a larger competitor may be free to use whatever new
concepts are developed by others and utilize their superior resources to
take over the market. This is no less the case with software than it is
with other industries.
Ultimately, the difficulty with all of these arguments is that they can
be applied to virtually any technology. If taken to their logical conclu-
sion, the patent system should be abolished and all inventions should be
in the public domain.
III
The Need For Patent Protection for Software
Both copyright and patent protection should be available for
software because, quite simply, both forms of protection are appropriate.
13. Id.
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Software is both literary and technological, expressive and inventive. As
discussed above, the U.S. legal system has a strong bias against misap-
propriation of intellectual property. When the courts are convinced that
misappropriation has taken place, they will fashion a remedy. Since pat-
ent protection was perceived not to be available for much software until
at least 1981 when the Supreme Court ruled in Diamond v. Diehr, the
courts have had to look to copyright for preventing misappropriation.
The result has been such controversial decisions as Whelan Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratories4 and Lotus v. Paperback Software. 5 The
problem with such cases is that deciding if copyrighted expression has
been misappropriated in a given situation is very difficult. As stated in
the Lotus opinion:
It seems the better part of wisdom, if not valor, not to press the
search for a suitable bright-line test of copyrightability where Learned
Hand, even after decades of experience, found none.
By its nature, a legal test that requires weighing of factors or ele-
ments such as these is not a bright-line or an either-or test. It requires
of the decision maker, instead, an evaluative or "judgmental" weighing
of all relevant characteristics of the work in which a copyright is
claimed, all relevant characteristics of the allegedly infringing work,
and all of the relevant circumstances of their development and use. It
requires, also, not a step-by-step decision making process, but a simul-
taneous weighing of all the factors or elements that the legal test iden-
tifies as relevant.16
The defendants in the Lotus case had argued for a bright line rule
that only source and object codes of a computer program could be cov-
ered by a copyright, never non-literal elements, such as a user interface. 7
In support of their proposed bright line rule, the defendants asserted the
same kind of arguments that are advanced against software patents -
that software was a different kind of work and that the usual intellectual
property protection rules therefore should not apply to it."s After a re-
view of the congressional intent expressed in the 1980 revisions to the
Copyright Act specifically extending copyright protection for software,
Judge Keeton refused to accept the position that software should be
treated differently than other copyrighted works.19
The Lotus decision is in accordance with well-established copyright
principles. The conflicting policy issues argued to the court were largely
considered in the 1976 and 1980 revisions to the Copyright Act, and the
14. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
15. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
16. Id. at 60-61.
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 54.
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resulting legislative history shows a congressional intent to treat software
in essentially the same manner as other copyrighted works.20
The use of a three part evaluative test, as in Lotus, 2 for determining
non-literal infringement in software cases means that it will continue to
be very difficult for intellectual property counsel to give definitive in-
fringement opinions to their software clients. Trying software infringe-
ment cases will continue to be demanding for counsel and the courts.
Determining an appropriate scope of protection for a software copyright,
whether for an infringement opinion or in litigation, requires a detailed
examination of the scope and content of prior software to the copy-
righted work and a similar detailed comparison of the copyrighted and
alleged infringing works. In most other forms of copyrighted works,
judges and juries have a frame of reference to carry out such evaluations.
In contrast, the highly technical nature of much software is strange and
incomprehensible to those not skilled in the art. The absence of any sig-
nificant prosecution history, administrative record in copyright registra-
tion proceedings, or any definition of the copyright protection
comparable to those available with patent claims makes such decision-
making more difficult than in comparable patent infringement opinions
and litigation. In the patent application process, the claims defining the
scope of the invention asserted by the applicant are evaluated by the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office examiner both for their definiteness and for
stating a patentable distinction over the prior art, and the claims in the
issued patent are the result of this examination process.22
Because copyright protection is inexpensive and easy to obtain, it
has been the dominant form of intellectual property protection for
software. Essentially every program is copyrighted. If software patents
are abolished, the software industry, the courts and intellectual property
counsel will continue to be faced with the difficulties of determining the
scope of copyright protection in non-literal infringement cases. The use
of software patents to provide coverage for processes and systems embod-
ied in software will reduce the need to broaden copyright protection for
preventing misappropriation. Both copyright and patent protection for
software are needed to provide a balanced system of intellectual property
protection for the literary and the technological components of software.
20. In 1980, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976, incorporating a definition of
"computer program," thereby including software as a copyrightable work, Act of Dec. 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (Copyright Act of 1980)(codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
21. Id.
22. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 13.
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In short, the perceived unavailability of patent protection for
software has caused courts to provide protection through principles of
copyright instead. The resulting protection, however, is problematic due
to the inappropriateness of addressing issues of invention and technology
under a system intended to address issues of expression. The availability




The copyright system has provided literary works with strong intel-
lectual property protection. Likewise, the patent system has provided
technologies with strong intellectual property protection. Since software
is both literary and technological, both forms of protection are appropri-
ate for it. At this point, the case against software patents remains
unproven.
